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INTRODUCTION
Of all the recent attention given to the subject of Islamic law,
perhaps the most unremarked upon, and yet also uncontested,
observation is the extent to which the basic source material of the
law, the vast compendia of norms and rules developed by medieval
Muslim jurists—herein referred to as shari’a1—have been rendered
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pittsburgh School of Law. My
gratitude and thanks extends in particular to Frank Vogel, Kilian Bälz, and
Mahmoud El Gamal for their stimulating presentations, which provided the
inspiration for this modest essay. As the essay is my own creation, I take full
responsibility for all characterizations and errors present herein.
1. I am (intelligently and thoughtfully) criticized for often defining this vast
and contradictory body of norms and rules developed by medieval jurists as
shari’a, rather than fiqh. See, e.g., Patrick S. O’Donnell, Divine Law (Shari’ah)
and Jurisprudence (Fiqh) in Islam, RATIO JURIS: LAW, POLITICS, PHILOSOPHY (A
MEMBER OF THE JURISDYNAMICS NETWORK) (June 26, 2009, 10:58 AM),
http://ratiojuris.blogspot.com/2009/06/divine-law-shariah-jurisprudence-fiqh.html.
It is true that the latter term is often used to describe the substantive rules derived
by such jurists. See FRANK E. VOGEL & SAMUEL L. HAYES III, ISLAMIC LAW AND
FINANCE: RELIGION, RISK AND RETURN 23-24 (1998) (distinguishing between
shari’a as the immutable Divine Law and fiqh as human efforts to capture that law
through scholarly interpretation). Yet at the same time my own realist
predispositions lead me to the conclusion that if shari’a is meant to refer to nothing
beyond a perfect and immutable Divine Law separate and apart from any human
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obsolete by modernity.2 To be sure, this is not the case in all positive
law in the modern Muslim nation state. Much to the chagrin of the
portion of Muslim society enamored with modern conceptions of
women’s rights, both family law and the law of inheritance remain
firmly based in shari’a discourse in most Muslim majority nations.3
effort to understand that law, then almost as a matter of epistemological necessity
it means precisely nothing that can be known and is of no value to lawyers. Shari’a
is not advanced even in American academic circles in such abstract terms, hence
the insistence of Professor Feldman, for example, that the Iraqi constitution urges
its legislature to “deploy the shari’a,” a statement that is meaningless unless
shari’a is in some way humanity’s concretization of the Divine. See Noah
Feldman, Response to Hamoudi, 2 MIDDLE E. L. & GOV’T J. 104, 105 (2010). This
is to say nothing of the manner in which shari’a is used in modern Muslim
discourse, where it absolutely includes references to some legal content. See, e.g.,
CLARK LOMBARDI, STATE LAW AS ISLAMIC LAW IN MODERN EGYPT: THE
INCORPORATION OF THE SHARI’A INTO EGYPTIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 180 (2006)
(quoting Case no. 7/1993/Supreme Constitutional Court (Egypt)). Finally, and
most appropriately for our purposes, the ubiquitous references to “shari’acompliant . . . financ[e]” confers upon shari’a a binding set of rules, not
unknowable aspects of the Divine. Joseph DiVanna, Guest Column, FIN. TIMES
(Dec. 13, 2010, 11:42 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/fb0eab76-064b-11e0-976b00144feabdc0.html#axzz1BVCMVkld. Accordingly, I find my own definition of
shari’a, while admittedly contestable, nevertheless the most appropriate one to
describe the corpus of the positive rules commonly referred to as “Islamic law,”
particularly in the area of Islamic finance.
2. See BERNARD G. WEISS, THE SPIRIT OF ISLAMIC LAW 188 (1998)
(describing the adoption of civil, criminal, commercial, and other legal codes in
Muslim countries, as a result of European colonialism, that modified or replaced
traditional Islamic law); Lama Abu-Odeh, The Politics of (Mis)recognition:
Islamic Law Pedagogy in American Academia, 52 AM. J. COMP. L. 789, 791-92
(2004) (pointing to a scholar’s flaw in applying traditional Islamic criminal law to
contemporary situations when the courts of Islamic countries have adjudicated
cases based on European criminal law for centuries); Haider Ala Hamoudi, The
Death of Islamic Law, 38 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 293, 295-97 (2010) (indicating
that Islamic states commonly adopt and apply laws transplanted from Western
societies even though Islamist rhetoric insists that the law should be Divine rather
than man-made).
3. WEISS, supra note 2, at 188; see Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 297 (contrasting
Islamists’ willingness to adopt man-made law in corporate law, contracts, and torts
with Islamists’ adamant obstruction of amendments or developments to family
law, where they believe Divine law is necessary); see also Abu-Odeh, supra note
2, at 792 (referencing liberal use of Islamic law in family law matters). But see
JUDITH E. TUCKER, WOMEN, FAMILY AND GENDER IN ISLAMIC LAW 65-83 (2008)
(acknowledging changes to traditional Islamic family law as reformists attempt to
reconcile a Qur’an-based view of marriage with modern marriage ideals);
Baudouin Dupret, What is Islamic Law?: A Praxiological Answer and an Egyptian
Case Study, 24 THEORY, CULTURE & SOC’Y 79, 88-90 (2007) (acknowledging that
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Beyond this, the record is far more mixed, with some states adopting
portions of shari’a in an otherwise thoroughly modern criminal
code,4 or recognizing the continuation of the Islamic religious
endowments known as the waqf.5
It is in the area of private law beyond family law and inheritance,
however, where shari’a suffered the most dramatic decline.6 In the
vast majority of Muslim nations, shari’a rules of contract, tort, and
most particularly partnership (including corporate law) were
displaced by transplanted European law to such an extent that most
Muslim lawyers in the Muslim world probably do not understand the
medieval system in the slightest, much less be able to practice within
any system that remotely resembled it.7
These core facts provide pivotal context to understand the
relatively recent surge of interest in Islamic finance. 8 While interest
modern judges applying family law are thoroughly bureaucratized administrative
officials of a modern nation-state who apply a particular version of shari’a that is
tied to a set of procedural rules and professional responsibilities, leading them to
approach their tasks entirely differently than a traditional Islamic judge from
another era).
4. See generally RUDOLPH PETERS, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN ISLAMIC LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE FROM THE SIXTEENTH TO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY
155-73 (2005) (detailing the history of the movements and legislation that
incorporated Islamic law into the criminal codes of Libya, Pakistan, Iran, Sudan,
and northern Nigeria, or applied Islamic law alongside secular criminal laws).
5. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Baghdad Booksellers, Basra Carpet Merchants,
and the Law of God and Man: Legal Pluralism and the Contemporary Muslim
Experience, 1 BERKELEY J. MIDDLE E. & ISLAMIC L. 83, 107 (2008) (illustrating
that the definitions of certain legal entities are rooted in shari’a, such as the
“waqf,” which can be translated as a Muslim charitable trust).
6. See Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 323-25 (asserting that Islamists neither
challenged the promulgation and application of civil and common law nor insisted
on the use of shari’a for private law matters, most specifically in the commercial
law context).
7. See id. at 311 (calling attention to the fact that the legal education of the
judiciary in Islamic states encompasses the civil and common law and not the
shari’a). But see id. at 309-10 (suggesting that even though shari’a is becoming
less relevant in private law, some Islamic concepts continue to survive the
transplantation of European law—most specifically the shari’a concept of the
waqf, or land trust, which continues to remain in the modern Civil Code).
8. See Kenneth Silber, The Rise of Islamic Finance, RESEARCH MAG. (Sept. 1,
2008), http://www.advisorone.com/article/rise-islamic-finance (noting the rise of
interest in Islamic finance among Muslims and non-Muslims, particularly when
lenders can employ certain methods to overcome shari’a’s prohibition on interest);
see also IBRAHIM WARDE, ISLAMIC FINANCE IN THE GLOBAL ECONOMY 1 (2000)
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in shari’a as it concerns private law (beyond family law) has
generally declined within the broader Muslim polity to the point that
the rules are not only obsolete, but also largely unknown, Islamic
finance stands as a stark exception. It is an area of growing
importance and relevance, and one that purports to be an application
and modern resurrection of shari’a.
Admittedly, it is in large part a voluntary adherence to shari’a
rather than a state-mandated one, as Islamic finance transactions in
all but a handful of countries are not required by state law but rather
ensured through a form of voluntary compliance, in a manner that
will be addressed later in this essay.9 However, that solution hardly
resolves the difficulty. Even positing that the practice is to be
voluntary, how does one go about crafting rules and limitations to
govern a deeply and fundamentally contemporary practice using
source material that is medieval in its origin? This is not, after all,
some sort of effort to revert to shari’a in all private law matters—
that would preclude any notion of legal personality, corporate limited
liability, or general theory of contract.10 Islamic banks rely on every
single one of these concepts of modernity and it seems obvious to
say that they could not survive otherwise. The rise of Islamic finance
is instead an effort to create sensible rules of application for modern
financial institutions on the basis of particular medieval rules that
(noting that the first Islamic banks did not exist until the 1970s, but have since
expanded operations to over seventy countries and have forty times the assets they
did in the early 1980s).
9. See, e.g., Kristin Smith, The Kuwait Finance House and the Islamization of
Public Life in Kuwait, in THE POLITICS OF ISLAMIC FINANCE 168, 182 (Clement M.
Henry & Rodney Wilson eds., 2004) (illustrating how the Kuwait Finance House,
the second largest bank in Kuwait, adheres to shari’a by maintaining a voluntary,
rather than mandatory, system of complying with the Kuwait Central Bank, even
though this voluntary scheme entails a number of institutional drawbacks); see also
Edna Fernandes, Sharia Law UK: Mail on Sunday Gets Exclusive Access to a
British Muslim Court, DAILY MAIL (July 4, 2009, 9:57 PM), http://www.daily
mail.co.uk/news/article-1197478/Sharia-law-UK--How-Islam-dispensing-justiceside-British-courts.html# (illustrating the rare changing tide in the United Kingdom
to move from voluntary compliance with shari’a court rulings on financial
disputes, to mandatory compliance by enforcing the shari’a court judgments
through the state’s civil courts).
10. E.g., Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 309 (pointing out the substantive legal
problems with the Mecelle (Ottoman Civil Code) operating as a continental civil
code, given its lack of “any concept of legal personhood” or notion of limited
liability companies).
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hardly seem relevant to modernity.11 Ultimately, what the practice
purports to do, its entire justificatory framework, lies in the
resurrection of (selectively decided upon) rules of shari’a applied in
a commercial and economic environment that bears no resemblance
to that which existed at the time the rules were developed.12
To say that this challenge raises any number of thorny theoretical
questions difficult to resolve is an understatement. The most obvious
is the irony of the selectivity. For example, why may an Islamic bank
enjoy legal personality in derogation of shari’a but may not take
interest on a loan? This question, however, is a debate for another
time and place, as it involves considerations well beyond those of
Islamic finance alone.13
More to our purposes, precisely what is the Islamic methodology
that is to be applied so as to glean, from disparate sets of juristic
compendia spanning hundreds of years, a set of methodologically
sound principles that might become the bedrock of a modern
financial practice? More centrally, who will be entrusted to apply
those principles to develop the relevant rules? Finally, will whatever
hybrid creature that emerges from this primordial soup of rules,
sacred texts, and purposes serve as an example for any attempt to
resurrect other areas of Islamic law, either in terms of methodology
or the location of institutionalized authority?
These questions are not easy to answer, and it is a testament to
their difficulty that they are still being grappled with. Fortunately, the
July 27, 2010 plenary session of the XVIIIth Congress of the
International Academy of Comparative Law, the subject of this
11. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, The Muezzin’s Call and the Dow Jones Bell: On
the Necessity of Realism in the Study of Islamic Law, 56 AM. J. COMP. L. 423, 436
(2008) (“A modern legal code cannot truly be made from hundreds of
contradictory juristic texts spanning over a thousand years, particularly when, as in
matters of commerce and finance, the texts deal largely with material that is either
irrelevant or deeply offensive to modern sensibilities . . . .”).
12. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Jurisprudential Schizophrenia: On Form and
Function in Islamic Finance, 7 CHI. J. INT’L. L. 605, 610 (2007) (describing the
shortcomings of the methodology of the modern jurisprudence in developing a
uniform set of rules).
13. I have discussed elsewhere the rather odd selectivity of legal areas in which
Islamist groups appear to engage. Some obvious departures from shari’a are
ignored (such as the universal modern prohibition against slavery), while others are
deemed indispensable (such as money interest on a loan).
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essay, provided an ideal opportunity to explore such matters in
greater depth and included a panel of speakers that was as diverse as
it was distinguished.14 While each speaker spoke to his own area of
interest and expertise, and each focused on a disparate aspect of
Islamic finance, what united the presentations can be brought back to
what might be called a core aspect of modern Islamic finance—what
is its relationship to the shari’a, and who gets to decide core
questions of Islamicity? This essay shall explore each presentation in
more detail to highlight the ways in which these ideas manifest
themselves in different aspects of Islamic finance and its alternatives.

I. PROFESSOR FRANK VOGEL AND THE NATURE
OF ISLAMIC LAW
Professor Vogel’s initial contribution framed the question
presented in this essay with far more historical nuance and with
reference to the substance of the shari’a itself. Professor Vogel’s
primary task was to narrate the manner in which Islamic law
developed positive rules and the manner in which those rules might
be used to construct, or in this case to resurrect, a framework of
regulation.15
As would be appropriate in any exposition on law in a foreign
context, Professor Vogel centers the conversation squarely on the
matter of authority. In other words, and to expand on his ideas in a
manner relevant to this essay, Muslims consider that under core
theological principles, Islam’s holiest texts arise from God and are
provided to humanity in the form of Revelation to the Prophet
Muhammad.16 Without more, under this reduced paradigm, the only
source material of the law is the Revealed Book of God, the Qur’an,
and the example of the Prophet himself in the form of his deeds,
14. The XVIIIth International Congress of the International Academy of
Comparative Law, INT’L ACAD. COMP. L., http://www.iuscomparatum.org/141
_p_4109/washington-congress-2010.html (last visited July 1, 2011).
15. Frank Vogel, Former Dir., Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harvard Law
School, Remarks at the Islamic Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth
Proceedings of the International Academy of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010)
[hereinafter Vogel Presentation] (transcript on file with American University
International Law Review).
16. M. Cherif Bassiouni & Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources,
Interpretation and Rule-Making, 1 U.C.L.A. J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E. L. 135, 147-48
(2002) (describing core conception of revelation in the Islamic tradition).
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words, and utterances, known as the Sunna.17 Following this
paradigm, without elaboration, any number of Muslims reflexively
and seemingly un-contemplatively “hurl”18 pieces of the Sunna at
one another to demonstrate the obvious truth of some principle or
other, in a manner entirely disassociated from any political context or
any ethical framework.
As a historical matter, and among Muslims who take their
doctrinal traditions seriously, the matter is not such an “exegetical
free-for-all,”19 and the question Vogel chooses to focus on is not
what the source material of the law should be, nor even the
methodology used to interpret the source material (though that is of
some importance), but rather who will be entrusted with its
interpretation? In short, who may undertake the effort, referred to in
Arabic as ijtihad, to derive the rules from the source material?20
Professor Vogel then initiated the analysis and began with
Schacht’s well-known statement that Islamic law represents an
“extreme case of a ‘jurists’’ law.”21 Stated more fully, as the shari’a
developed, its substance was not decided by a political authority,
such as a caliph, nor by state officials, such as a judiciary, nor by any
other sort of state sanctioned body,22 but rather by particular schools
17. See JOSEPH SCHACHT, THE ORIGINS OF MUHAMMADAN JURISPRUDENCE 2
(1950) (defining the Sunna as the behavior and traditions of the Prophet
Muhammad and stating that the two recognized sources of Islamic law are the
Qur’an and the Sunna); Russell Powell, Zakat: Drawing Insights for Legal Theory
and Economic Policy from Islamic Jurisprudence, 7 PITT. TAX REV. 43, 50-51
(2007) (describing the various canonical texts of Sunna in the Sunni tradition that
are used to interpret the Qur’an and that supply a large body of legal precedent in
Islamic law).
18. See KHALED ABOU EL FADL, THE GREAT THEFT: WRESTLING ISLAM FROM
THE EXTREMISTS 90 (2005) (using Ghazali’s metaphor, made famous in the
English language by El Fadl, to refer to the attempts of particular modern
fundamentalists, untrained in legal theory and analysis, to apply the law by
“hurling traditions at their opponents to score cheap points”).
19. ANDREW F. MARCH, ISLAM AND LIBERAL CITIZENSHIP: THE SEARCH FOR
AN OVERLAPPING CONSENSUS 68 (2009) (using the phrase to describe the process
of examining religious rules without considering a religion’s doctrinal
underpinnings).
20. See Bassiouni & Badr, supra note 16, at 153 (describing ijtihad as
developing a legal opinion based on the sources of law).
21. JOSEPH SCHACHT, AN INTRODUCTION TO ISLAMIC LAW 209 (1982).
22. See LOMBARDI, supra note 1, at 49-54 (presenting the Islamic argument for
a revival of the theory that a political authority can promulgate rules for the greater
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of thought entirely divorced from state control. Ultimately, four such
schools emerged in the Sunni tradition, described accurately as
guilds by the late Professor George Makdisi because of their
institutional similarity to that Western medieval institution.23
Individual jurists within each guild developed vast compendia of
rules derived within their respective schools, and it is the sum corpus
of these contradictory, varying, and immense compendia that form
the substance of the rules from which Islamic law is derived.
The problem is that, with the advent of the colonial era, the juristic
schools lessened in importance and ultimately disappeared in large
parts of the Muslim world.24 To compound the difficulty, with the
rise of the nation-state came not only transplanted law, but also
transplanted political institutions and bureaucratic and administrative
procedures. This process began as late as the end of the eighteenth
century,25 and was therefore long complete by the creation of the first
Islamic banks near the end of the twentieth century.
So then, what is an emerging “Islamic” financial practice to do in
order to make determinations respecting the shari’a compliance of
its activities? There appears to be at least three options. First, one
could adopt the ideas of one particular school of thought. However,
such an approach is fundamentally limiting in terms of acceptable
rules that may be derived, and it appears antiquated because the
schools, as vibrant rulemaking institutions, no longer exist. Second,
public good, thus enabling the state to enact positive law while shari’a retains a
function within the state). But see Hamoudi, supra note 2, at 328-32 (questioning
whether states can sensibly and with internal consistency retain a role for shari’a
in the Islamic state, while also enacting positive law that may contradict shari’a,
such as legislation that promotes women’s rights).
23. See SHERMAN A. JACKSON, ISLAMIC LAW AND THE STATE: THE
CONSTITUTIONAL JURISPRUDENCE OF SHIHĀB AL-DĪN AL-QARĀFĪ 103-04 (1996)
(explaining and critiquing Professor Makdisi’s claim that the Sunni’s madhhabs, or
schools of legal thought, satisfied the criteria for guilds because they were
professional, took up a specific economic sector, strictly regulated who could
receive licenses to teach and give legal opinions, were independent from
government, used a hierarchical structure, and were led by a headman).
24. See EL FADL, supra note 18, at 35-37 (detailing the systematic
nationalization, secularization, and limits to legal education imposed upon shari’a
schools that led to the schools closing or producing only religious ministers rather
than jurists).
25. See id. at 26 (explaining that the process began with the “age of
colonialism”).
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some fusion of the four schools could be undertaken. But, would
such an approach even be defensible, given that each school, at least
in theory, developed rules according to a distinct set of
methodological doctrinal principles, not susceptible of being stitched
together artificially after a period of centuries to address modern
concerns? Third, perhaps an entirely fresh approach is warranted.
The original sacred text could be reinterpreted in a way that
derogates from earlier juristic rules—a process Abduh referred to as
the reopening of the gates of ijtihad?26
Professor Vogel has indicated that the approach of Islamic finance
has generally chosen the second of the three options above. That is,
finance rules are selected from among all four schools on largely
functional principles, favoring rules that operate best under modern
circumstances.27 Elsewhere Professor Vogel indicated that this
functional drive is balanced against a need to not de-contextualize
individual rules or “patch” them together in a manner that deprives
the Islamic system of what he refers to as its “internal logic.” 28 The
qualification is necessary, for it would not be difficult to create from
the disparate fabric of over a millennium of juristic rules a set of
principles that satisfy any interpreter, whether he is Vladimir Lenin,
Milton Friedman, or Osama Bin Laden. The solution lies in the
putative balance of logic on the one side and utilitarian selection on
the other.
However, the idea of adopting rules from four schools on the basis
of the methods described above does leave open the very question of
authority with which his presentation began. That is to say, in the
absence of juristic schools, one might well ask who will be entrusted
with this task of determining what is legitimate functional choice and
what is irresponsible patching together of de-contextualized rules.
This would be a problem regardless of which rules were adopted, but
26. See Haider Ala Hamoudi, Muhammad’s Social Justice or Muslim Cant:
Langdellianism and the Rise of Islamic Finance, 40 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 89, 127-28
n.225 (2007) (illustrating the broad scope of reforms that may be needed in order
to resurrect the development of legal rules, such as the “expansive use of reason”
to promote Islamic “solutions to the problems of modern society”).
27. Vogel Presentation, supra note 15.
28. VOGEL & HAYES, supra note 1, at 37-38 (cautioning against constructing
legal rules that are replicas of Western legal rules by picking and choosing
preferred rules in a de-contextualized fashion).
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when the methodology is to synthesize disparate sets of rules into a
whole that never previously existed, the problem becomes
particularly acute.
The point, to be clear, is not that such determinations will not be
subject to criticism by academics who will claim that they are less
reflections on sacred text than responses to external economic and
ideological stimuli operating in the relevant social space, though that
is an assertion I have made in other contexts.29 Rather, the point is
that perceptions of legitimacy within the community will certainly
depend on the extent to which those doing the interpreting, and the
synthesizing of rules from among the four schools, are deemed to be
authentic.
This was not a question that Professor Vogel sought to answer, nor
should it have been. His remarks were not designed to provide
solutions, but only to raise the proper questions in Islamic finance, a
matter he undertook with considerable success.

II. DR. KILIAN BÄLZ AND BROADER LESSONS
FOR ISLAMIC LAW
Dr. Bälz picked up with the very question of authority that
Professor Vogel left open.30 To Dr. Bälz, this question of authority in
Islamic finance, and the matter of who determines Islamicity, is the
central question with which to grapple.
In this context, the voluntary nature of Islamic finance is of
fundamental importance because it removes the state, the judiciary,
and the jurists as the agents of legal change or as the authority
responsible for interpreting shari’a.31 The practice is not based on
state law, as the contracts pursuant to which Islamic finance is
29. See Hamoudi, supra note 11, at 437-38 (criticizing “internal logic” in
shari’a as merely a confirmation of a particular preexisting set of ideological and
normative commitments).
30. Kilian Bälz, Partner, Amereller Legal Consultants, Remarks at the Islamic
Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth Proceedings of the International Academy
of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter Bälz Presentation] (transcript on
file with American University International Law Review).
31. See generally ABDULLAHI AHMED AN NA‘IM, ISLAM AND THE SECULAR
STATE: NEGOTIATING THE FUTURE OF SHARI‘A 293 (2008) (positing that enforcing
mandatory compliance of shari’a is not within the duties of the state because
shari’a is inherently diverse where state authority is uniform).
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organized are governed by foreign law (often New York or English
law), marginalizing the role of state officers to make many
determinations about the content of Islamic law. This is doubly so
because of the frequency of arbitration clauses rendering the judge’s
role an exceedingly marginal one.32
There is a reason that this has been undertaken, and state influence
has been minimized. The driving concern among practitioners is not
that state courts and state officials will ignore shari’a, but that
shari’a will be given undue attention. There is a clear fear that if a
particular financial structure is carefully established by practitioners
and agents of Islamic finance, and a court is given an opportunity, it
may gleefully dispute the Islamicity of the structure and declare it
invalid under core Islamic principles. This problem is particularly
acute in the Islamic finance context given the approach the practice
has undertaken, as described effectively by Professor Vogel, to
develop its rules of practice. If, after all, what we have in Islamic
finance is a rather artificial synthesis of disparate rules of four
medieval Islamic schools patched together by some sort of internal
logic, it would not be difficult for a judge to reach an entirely
different conclusion on how the synthesis should have been
undertaken, and to disallow a structure that violated that judge’s own
vision.
The prospect that this may occur, and the dangers it creates
respecting enforceability, were described by Dr. Bälz appropriately
as “shari’a risk,” meaning that the invocation of shari’a is the
perceived bar to enforceability, not the mechanism by which it will
be enforced.33 The danger is considerable enough that not only is
New York law chosen (so as to ensure that the contract is enforced
according to its terms), but also there is an increasing proliferation of
what Dr. Bälz referred to as “Waiver of Shari’a Defense” clauses,
which prevent the parties from being able to assert in court that the
transaction in question is not compliant with shari’a as a defense to
enforceability.34 This concept led Dr. Bälz to characterize Islamic
finance not so much as a legal practice, but as one derived from
ethics.
32. See Bälz Presentation, supra note 30.
33. Id.
34. Id.
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While Dr. Bälz is clearly on to something, this terminology can be
criticized; ethics are generally understood as standard-driven maxims
of loose applicability whose purposes are not thwarted by formal
evasion.35 Islamic finance is replete with formal artifices to avoid
transactions that would otherwise be prohibited and is designed for
the specific purpose of rule avoidance, which is hardly characteristic
of most ethical frameworks.36 The simplest and most controversial
example is the tawarruq, a form of synthetic sale and markup where
the bank buys a particular item from a straw man and sells it at a
markup reflecting prevailing interest rates to the borrower. The
balance is to be paid in installments over the course of a particular
period of time, but well before this, in fact immediately after its
initial purchase, the item is resold for cash to the original seller for its
original price, with no time elapsing between the three sales (straw
man to bank, bank to borrower, and borrower back to straw man).
The item never leaves its warehouse, and the borrower receives a
sum certain in cash with an obligation to pay it back to the bank at a
higher rate that corresponds precisely to market rates.37 One could
criticize such an artifice as inauthentic or defend it as in keeping with
formal rules, but it is hard to see precisely how one could argue that
the practice has very much to do with ethics. Still, Dr. Bälz’s
distinction between reliance on state law and private ordering is an
apt one.
As a result of this privatization of shari’a, the main set of
institutions responsible for determining shari’a compliance, or the
highly disembodied and dissolute authority to apply rules to govern
financial transactions, are what is known as “shari’a review boards,”
whose review and approval must be obtained for any transaction.38
These are generally selected and approved by the practitioners
35. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL ELEMENTS OF ETHICS 20 (Great
Books Found. 1949) (1780) (explaining that ethics produces universal principles to
which every person should strive, and there should be no exceptions to making
those principles one’s own).
36. See Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 118 (claiming that Islamic financial
institutions often depend on the complicated nature of the commercial structures in
order to confuse Muslim consumers).
37. Id. at 119-20.
38. See Hamoudi, supra note 5, at 101 (explaining the significant role and
binding nature of the shari’a review board, as a non-state actor, in judging
compliance with shari’a).
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designing the transaction. Equally important, however, and the true
source of innovation, are the law firms, accounting firms, and
investment banking institutions which create vehicles that conform to
the requirements of the shari’a review boards and yet still meet
consumer demands.39
Equally relevant is the fact that this model of private ordering and
reliance on non-state mechanisms and institutions could prove
relevant in areas of private law, ranging from the Islamic law of
contract (Dr. Bälz’s example) to the law of the family (my example),
where Muslims—particularly in liberal states—refer matters of
dispute to the local imam and address any disputes arising internally
without state assistance or intervention.
In other words, Dr. Bälz does offer us a solution to the conundrum
of how to adopt medieval rules into a modern practice, largely by
leapfrogging over matters of responsible methodology and arriving
at the more fundamental question of locating a legitimate authority to
undertake it. To Dr. Bälz, the truly fascinating and innovative aspect
of Islamic finance is that the authority in question is in fact private
and more intimately tied to the modalities of operation of
international finance than any court.40

III. PROFESSOR MAHMOUD EL GAMAL AND THE
NEGLECTED MUSLIM POOR
The one aspect left unaddressed by Dr. Bälz is the legitimacy of
that disembodied and decentralized authority among the broader
Muslim polity. Far from the self-financed guilds of jurists of the
medieval era, these private actors are hired by the firms looking for
transaction approval, often on a transaction by transaction basis, are
paid by those firms, may be discharged by those firms, and generally
are under confidentiality obligations not to disclose the details of the
transactions on which they have worked.41 The lack of impartiality is
obvious—quite clearly any shari’a review board member who
developed a reputation for being obstinate or difficult would have a
hard time finding work, while those who were more willing to be
flexible and accommodating to the demands of the law firms and
39. But see Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 118.
40. Bälz Presentation, supra note 30.
41. Id.
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banks responsible for hiring them would be financially rewarded for
the same. This is hardly the basis upon which a broadly legitimate
and independent interpretive authority can be established, a point Dr.
Bälz did not contest.
Professor El Gamal spent substantial time offering a critique along
these lines. Professor El Gamal found no legitimacy in the
institutions that comprised Islamic finance, and correspondingly, no
authenticity to their means of deriving medieval rules.42 Professor El
Gamal has moreover offered elsewhere a thoughtful alternative set of
ideas to what he views as a more responsible way to understand
shari’a as developed by the medieval jurists, and how to use the
principles underlying their rules to create a more sensible system. 43
However, the focus of his presentation, in keeping with the themes of
the other two participants, focused on the relationship between the
methodology and the authority, rather than solely on matters of
hermeneutics.44
Professor El Gamal maintains that the practice of Islamic finance,
and thus implicitly the authority underlying it, about which Dr. Bälz
generally spoke in positive terms, has failed the broader Muslim
community. There is always this danger whenever regulation of
lawmaking institutions is left in private hands. While none could
doubt that state officials have their own interests to protect, the
interests of private actors, who stand to profit considerably if some
interpretations are developed to the derogation of others, are
comparatively larger. The risk that the rules will then be developed
in a way that serves the interests of the financial classes alone
thereby becomes quite a severe one.45
42. Mahmoud El Gamal, Professor of Economics, Rice Univ., at the Islamic
Finance Plenary Session of the XVIIIth Proceedings of the International Academy
of Comparative Law (July 27, 2010) [hereinafter El Gamal Presentation]
(transcript on file with American University International Law Review).
43. See generally Mahmoud A. El-Gamal, An Economic Explication of the
Prohibition of Ribā in Classical Islamic Jurisprudence 1-18 (May 2, 2001),
http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~elgamal/files/riba.pdf (arguing that medieval jurist ’Ibn
Rushd’s rationale for prohibiting Ribā contains elements of modern economic
theory, specifically relating to the maximization of economic efficiency).
44. El Gamal Presentation, supra note 42.
45. See Kilian Bälz, Visiting Scholar, Islamic Legal Studies Program, Harv. L.
School, Sharia Risk? How Islamic Finance Has Transformed Islamic Contract Law
25 (May 1, 2008) (transcript available at http://www.law.harvard.edu/programs/
ilsp/publications/balz.pdf) (pointing out that market forces and private actors
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Thus, Professor El Gamal insists, the practice has developed in a
manner not designed to protect or serve the Muslim public, but to
maximize profit.46 The transaction must be structured in a manner
that will appeal to Muslim consumers, but it could never be fairly
said that shari’a review boards do very much to serve the broader
Muslim polity or (Professor El Gamal’s focus) the Muslim poor.
Given that the boards and the innovators of Islamic finance under Dr.
Bälz’s paradigm are responsible for articulating a modern Islamic
legal practice, the question raised by Professor El Gamal’s
presentation is whether their disconnection from that polity and their
intimate familiarity with international finance is not as much a
hindrance as a benefit to ensure both authenticity and the continued
viability of Islamic financial practice.
Professor El Gamal’s solution accepts the reality of the private
ordering that Dr. Bälz effectively lays out, for it seems inconceivable
that Islamic finance is likely to be reorganized to serve primarily the
Muslim poor.47 Rather, Professor El Gamal seeks to use private
ordering as a means to serve the Muslim poor through a form of
micro-financing that neither contravenes contemporary notions of a
prohibition on interest, nor adopts for-profit financing mechanisms,
relying instead on Islam-compliant commutative structures and
mutual cooperatives that support economic development and are
based on organic models in the region.48
The thrust of the claim is that it works. Perhaps anticipating the
critique that social justice financing initiatives are noble in their
intentions but are hardly the basis for a sustained practice, Professor
El Gamal spent much of his presentation offering a wealth of careful
empirical information to show that the cooperative was successful, in
determine how Islamic financial law develops even when the state dictates law
reform generally or implements policies aimed at creating a purely Islamic state).
46. See id. at 24-26 (arguing that international commercial law heavily
influences Islamic finance law).
47. See IMTIAZ B. ALI, WAQF: A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT INSTITUTION
FOR MUSLIM COMMUNITIES 15 (2009), available at http://www.takaafultt.org/
images/WAQF_Book.pdf (explaining that the more recently proposed waqf microfinancing system would likely only succeed in non-Muslim states with a minority
population of Muslim poor because in states where Muslims are minorities there is
a stronger need to develop their Muslim communities and protect and promote
Islam).
48. El Gamal Presentation, supra note 42.
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fact more successful than comparable micro-financing institutions.49
This achievement possibly is due to its compliance with common
understandings of shari’a as manifested in the modern world as well
as its dedication to serving a Muslim underclass largely ignored by
contemporary Islamic finance.

CONCLUSION
Despite nearly half a century of progress and an explosion of
interest, Islamic finance appears to struggle with many of the
problems common to most features of reinvigorated shari’a.50 These
problems center around one essential and indeed existential
difficulty. To be relevant and applicable in the modern world, shari’a
requires reinvigoration of fresh ideas to decide which of the historic
rules will be used to maintain what Professor Vogel would call
Islamic “internal logic.” Yet for change to occur in any legal
tradition, much less a religiously based one, it requires a legitimate
agent. Many of the disputes and disagreements in Islamic finance are
mere manifestations of this problem. Dr. Bälz located legitimacy and
authenticity in the private actors that control Islamic finance, where
Professor El Gamal dismissed them as self-interested, engaged in
acts of “shari’a-arbitrage” and therefore not the basis of a long-term
sustainable practice. With shari’a, the problem is not necessarily a
lack of fresh ideas, as evidenced by the speakers’ presentations.
Indeed, the same might be said of other thinkers in other aspects of
shari’a—Khaled Abou El Fadl respecting democracy,51 Abdullahi
An Naim concerning secularism,52 and Andrew March concerning
liberalism.53 The problem in Islamic finance tends to be the lack of
an authority that can articulate and apply these fresh ideas to promote
49. Id.
50. See generally Hamoudi, supra note 26, at 116-124 (explaining the failures
of Islamic finance and discussing the dynamic complexities between traditional
Islamic shari’a principles and modern international commercial law).
51. See generally KHALED ABOU EL FADL, ISLAM AND THE CHALLENGE OF
DEMOCRACY 65-66 (Joshua Cohen & Deborah Chasman eds., 2004) (encouraging
a “free society in which all Muslims can debate what constitutes Shari’ah”).
52. See generally AN NA’IM, supra note 31, at 4, 95 (arguing that Muslims will
be able to voluntarily adhere to shari’a and not be forced to comply with a stateendorsed artificially narrow conception of shari’a when they are in a secular state).
53. See generally MARCH, supra note 19, at 64, 71 (asserting that the
framework of a liberal democracy is not necessarily opposed to Islamic principles
and arguing a liberal justification for these principles).
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a broader communal acceptance.54 That Islamic finance rules are
intensely criticized as formalistic and illegitimate, by respected
figures like Professor El Gamal,55 despite the fact that finance rules
are among the most successful efforts at shari’a reinvigoration,
illustrates how deep the problem runs.

54. See EL FADL, supra note 51, at 35-37 (showing why there may be a lack of
modern Islamic legal scholars to promulgate new ideas).
55. See also Hamoudi, supra note 12, at 610 (expressing similar misgivings to
Professor El Gamal on whether the modern application of shari’a accomplishes
either the theoretical or practical goals that would help make traditional shari’a
relevant in modern contexts).

